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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment in a civil case entered
in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah. The partial
summary judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This appeal was initiated in the Utah
Court of Appeals and subsequently, on motion of appellant, transferred to the Supreme
Court. On September 19, 1989, the appeal was transferred from the Supreme Court to
the Court of Appeals. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann, section 78-2a-3(2)(j).

DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-12-12 - POSSESSION MUST
BE CONTINUOUS AND TAXES PAID.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established
under the provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall
be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for a
period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellant, Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. ("Gillmor") is the owner of real
property located on the east side of "Old Ranch Road" in Summit County, Utah. His
neighbors on the west side of Old Ranch Road are defendants/respondents Jeffrey and
Janet Garlick ("Garlicks") and Allan Pelton ("Pelton").
Gillmor traces his title to his property to a Warranty Deed dated October
25, 1926 from Charles R. and Isabel Spencer, as grantors, to Steven T. Gillmor. [Aff. of
Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr., 5 2; R. 221 (a certified copy of this deed is contained at R.
247).] This deed identifies the road as the western boundary of the Gillmor property and
describes the property conveyed as follows:
The East h, Southeast \ of Northwest \, and the
Northeast \ of Southwest \ of Section 28, Township 1
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 400
acres more or less, ALSO
Beginning at a point 100 rods South and 12 rods West
from the Northwest corner of said Section 28, Township
1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, at a point on
the East side of a public road 6 rods wide and 3 rods
Easterly at right angles from the center line of said road;
and running thence East 12 rods; thence North 20 rods;
thence East 80 rods; thence South 240 rods to the South
line of said section; thence West 18 rods; thence North
105 rods; thence West approximately 5 rods to a point
on the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod wide road and
at a point 3 rods Easterly from the center line of said
road and at right angles thereto; thence along the
Easterly side of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the
2

center line thereof and at right angles thereto, Northerly
and Westerly to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest
corner of the Northwest \ of Section 28, aforesaid;
thence West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on a direct line
61 rods more or less, to the point of beginning and
containing 78.25 acres more or less, (emhasis added)
[R. 247.]
On the death of Steven Gillmor, the Gillmor property passed to Charles F.
and Clara Gillmor. [Aff. of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr., I 3; R. 222.] On May 15, 1953,
Charles F. and Clara Gillmor, as grantors, conveyed the Gillmor property by Warranty
Deed to Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. and Edward Leslie Gillmor. [Id., f 3 (a certified copy of
this Warranty Deed is contained in the record at 250).] This Warranty Deed also identifies
the western boundary of the Gillmor property as the county road and describes the
property conveyed as follows:
The East \, Southeast \ of Northwest \, and the
Northeast \ of Southwest \ of Section 28, Township 1
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian;
Also, Beginning at a point 100 rods South and 12 rods
West from the Northwest corner of said Section 28,
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, at
a point on the East side of public road 6 rods wide and
3 rods Easterly at right angles from the center line of
said road; and running thence East 12 rods; thence North
20 rods; thence East 80 rods; thence South 240 rods to
the South line of said Section; thence West 18 rods;
thence North 105 rods; thence West approximately 5 rods
to a point on the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod
wide road and at a point 3 rods Easterly from the center
3

line of said road and at right angles thereto; thence along
the Easterly side of said road and 3 rods Easterly from
the center line thereof and at right angles thereto,
Northerly and Westerly to a point 3 rods East from the
Southwest corner of the Northwest \ of Section 28,
aforesaid; thence West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on
a direct line 61 rods more or less, to the point of
beginning, (emphasis added)
[R. 250.] Gillmor acquired sole title to the property through judicial partition on February
17, 1981. [Aff. of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr., 5 4; R. 222.] On the Summit County Tax
Plats, the Gillmor property is identified under the Property Tax Serial No. of SS-59-A, and
the property is shown located on the east side of the county road. [R. 252-53.]
Pelton received title to the Pelton property under a Warranty Deed from
Veigh Cummings and JoEllen Cummings, as grantors, to W. Allan Pelton and JoAnn
Pelton, as grantees, in 1972. [Aff. of W. Allan Pelton, j 1; R. 179-80 (a copy of the deed
is contained in the record at 184).] The description of the property conveyed to Pelton
is as follows, a description which identifies the east boundary of the Pelton property as the
county road:
Beginning at a point in the North Line of a 60 foot road
and the Center Line of a County Road which point is
West along the Section Line 7.69 feet and South
perpendicular to said Section Line 2143.42 feet from the
Northeast Corner of Section 28, T1S, R4E, SLB&M,
thence North 89p43' West along said North Line of a 60
foot road 488.35 feet, thence North 0°19' West 464.12
feet, thence South 89° 43' East 327.2 feet to said West
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Line of County Road, thence South 19*24' East along
said road line 492.98 feet to the point of beginning.
Beginning at a point which is West along the Section
Line 933.63 feet and South perpendicular to said Section
Line 1674.65 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section
29, T1S, R4E, SLB&M, thence South 0°19' East 464.32
feet to the North Line of a 60 foot road, thence South
89° 48' East along said road line 163.5 feet, thence
continuing along said line South 89° 43' East 271.5 feet,
thence North 0°19' West 464.12 feet, thence North
89° 43' West 435.0 feet to the point of beginning,
(emphasis added)
[R. 184.] The Pelton property is identified on the Summit County Tax Plats under the
Property Tax Serial Nos. PP-87-15 and PP-87-20. [R. 252 and 253.] The tax plats show
the Pelton property located on the west of the side of the county road. [Id.]
In 1976, Pelton fenced, built a home on, and landscaped the Pelton property.
[Aff. of W. Allan Pelton, ffl 2-3; R. 180-81.] For each of the fifteen years from his
purchase of the Pelton property until the initiation of this lawsuit, Pelton paid the property
taxes assessed against the Pelton property. [Id., 5 5.]
The Garlicks trace their title to the Garlick property to a conveyance of that
property by Warranty Deed, dated August 1, 1978, from Peter B. Swaner, as grantor, to
Ennis J. and Barbara Ellen Parish Gibbs, as grantees. [Aff. of Ennis J. Gibbs, f 2; R. 17071 (a copy of that deed is contained in the record at 174).] This deed describes the
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property conveyed as follows, and identifies the east boundary of the Garlick property as
the county road:
BEGINNING at a point in a County Road which point
is South 2693.62 feet and East 207.02 feet from the
Northeast corner of Section 29, Township 1 South, Range
4 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 22° 48'
West along said County Road 333.11 feet; thence
continuing along said County Road North 19p 24' West
194.15 feet to the South line of proposed street; thence
North 89° 43' West along said street line 780.2 feet;
thence South 0° 45' East 460.0 feet; thence South 87° 59'
East 968.4 feet to the point of BEGINNING, (emphasis
added)
[R. 174.] In 1978 and again in 1980, the Gibbs had the Garlick property surveyed, and
both surveys identified the eastern boundary of the property as being the west side of the
county road. [Aff. of Ennis J. Gibbs, f 3; R. 171.]
In 1987, Ennis J. and Barbara Ellen Parish Gibbs, as grantors, conveyed the
Garlick property to Jeffrey K. and Janet E. Garlick. [Aff. of Jeffrey K. Garlick, f f 1-2;
R. 163-64 (a copy of the Warranty Deed is contained in the record at 167).] This deed
also identifies the county road as the eastern boundary of the Garlick property. The
Garlick property is identified on the Summit County Tax Plat under the Property Tax
Serial No. PP-87-16, and the tax plat shows the Garlick property located on the west side
of the county road. [R. 252-53.]
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In 1980, the Gibbs constructed a barn on the Garlick property, removed an
old fence from the property and re-fenced the entire boundary line of the Garlick property.
[Id., 5 4, R. 171.] In 1981, the Gibbs constructed a home on the Garlick property. [R.
171.] From 1978 until their sale of the property in 1987, the Gibbs paid property taxes
on the Garlick property in each year. [R. 171-72.] In 1987, after they purchased the
property from the Gibbs, the Garlicks paid property taxes on the Garlick property. [Aff.
of Jeffrey K. Garlick, f 4; R. 165.]
On October 15,1987, Gillmor initiated this action, seeking a declaration that
Gillmor owned the Garlick and Pelton property, and seeking damages for trespass, unlawful
detainer, and conversion. [R. 001-11.] On November 30, 1988, the Garlicks and Pelton
brought a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of Gillmor's claims
against them on the ground that the Garlicks and Pelton had established adverse
possession as to the Garlick and Pelton property. [R. 145-47.] On January 19, 1989, the
trial court granted the Garlicks' and Pelton's motion for summary judgment. [R. 254.] On
January 25, 1989, Gillmor filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment
ruling, supported by an additional affidavit of Gillmor and an affidavit of a surveyor, James
G. West. [R. 255-56.] On February 7, 1989, the trial court denied Gillmor's motion to
reconsider. [R. 283.] On February 10,1989, Gillmor filed an additional affidavit of James
G. West. [R. 289-93.] Gillmor thereafter commenced this appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT1
The Garlicks and Pelton deny that Gillmor has any claim of record to any
portion of the Garlick and Pelton property. Instead, the chain of title to the Gillmor
property reflects that Gillmor's property lies to the east of the county road. Likewise, the
chains of title to the Garlick and Pelton properties reflect that those parcels lie to the west
of the county road. Thus, there is no overlap between the properties upon which Gillmor
can found any claim to the Garlick and Pelton homes. However, in view of the long,
unchallenged occupancy of their properties, and in an effort to resolve this litigation as
expeditiously as possible, the Garlicks and Pelton moved the trial court to rule that they
had established adverse possession to the Garlick and Pelton property.
Even if record title to the parcels of property at issue in this litigation showed
an overlap in the property descriptions of those parcels, the Garlicks and Pelton have
established the elements of adverse possession, extinguishing any claim by Gillmor to any
portion of the Garlick and Pelton properties. In this appeal, Gillmor does not contest
the trial court's finding that the Garlicks and Pelton have been in "open, notorious, and
hostile possession" of their respective properties for a period in excess of seven years.
Rather, Gillmor claims that the Garlicks and Pelton have failed to satisfy one requirement
of adverse possession: the payment of taxes on the property for seven years. [Brief of
Appellant, at 11-12.] Indeed, Gillmor does not claim that the Garlicks and Pelton have
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not paid taxes on the Garlick and Pelton property. Instead, Gillmor claims that in 1986
and 1987 he paid taxes on the Garlick and Pelton property prior to the time that one or
the other of the Garlicks and Pelton paid those taxes. [Brief of Appellant, at 11-12.]
Relying on the decision in Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984), Gillmor urges
that by paying taxes on the Garlick and Pelton property, before the Garlicks and Pelton
paid those taxes, he interrupted the continuity of events necessary to establish adverse
possession and thereby defeated the Garlicks' and Pelton's claim to title to the property.
[Id., at 12.]
Gillmor's analysis is cogent only if Gillmor actually paid taxes on the Garlick
and Pelton property. In fact, the only evidence of payment of taxes submitted by Gillmor
is the fact that he paid taxes on the parcel of property identified by the Summit County
Property Serial No. of SS-59-A, a parcel of property shown on the Summit County Tax
Plats as being located on the east side of the county road. Gillmor has not paid any taxes
assessed against the parcels of property identified by the Summit County Tax Serial Nos.
PP-87-15, PP-87-16, or PP-87-20, the Garlick and Pelton properties.

On the official

Summit County tax records, the Garlick and Pelton properties are shown located on the
west side of the county road, and Gillmor has never paid taxes on the parcels of property
claimed by the Garlicks and Pelton. Thus, there is no evidence that Gillmor has ever paid
property taxes on the Garlick and Pelton property, and the doctrine of Parsons v.
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Anderson. 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984), is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The trial
court properly entered summary judgment that Garlick and Pelton have established all
elements to show adverse possession of the Garlick and Pelton properties.
Affidavits of James G. West, submitted by Gillmor in an effort to create an
issue of fact as to whether the Gillmor property overlapped the Garlick and Pelton
property in the Summit County tax records and in the record title to the respective parcels
of property fail to create an issue of material fact for at least two reasons. First, the
West affidavits cannot be considered part of the record on appeal inasmuch as those
affidavits were filed untimely, after the trial court had already granted the Garlicks' and
Pelton's summary judgment motion. Indeed, the second of the West affidavits was filed
with the court three days after the trial court denied Gillmor's motion to reconsider.
Second, neither of the West affidavits purports to describe the boundaries of the Gillmor
property on the basis of the description of that property contained in the deeds forming
the basis of Gillmor's chain of title. Thus, the West affidavits are simply irrelevant because
those affidavits do not deal with any parcel of property at issue in this litigation.
Finally, even if it is concluded that Gillmor has submitted evidence that he
paid taxes on the Pelton property prior to Pelton's payment of those taxes in 1987 and that
Gillmor paid taxes on the Garlick property prior to the Garlicks' payment of those taxes
in 1986, Gillmor has not created an issue of fact requiring reversal of the summary
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judgment. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Pelton offered evidence that
he had paid taxes on the Pelton property from 1972 on, a period of fifteen years. Even
if Gillmor has shown that he paid taxes on the Pelton property in 1987, prior to Pelton's
payment of those taxes, Gillmor has succeeded only in reducing the number of years in
which Pelton perfected a claim of adverse possession from fifteen to fourteen years. Even
accepting Gillmor's claims, Pelton has more than satisfied the seven year adverse
possession requirements. Likewise, the Garlicks submitted evidence that they, and their
predecessors in interest, had paid taxes on the Garlick property from 1978 until initiation
of this litigation, a period of ten years. Even if it is accepted that Gillmor paid taxes on
the Garlick property in 1986 before the Garlicks predecessors paid those taxes, Gillmor
will have succeeded only in reducing the period of the Garlicks' adverse possession to eight
years. Again, even accepting Gillmor's claims, the Garlicks have more than satisfied Utah's
adverse possession requirements.

ARGUMENT
If trial were required in this matter, the Garlicks and Pelton would show that
there is no overlap of record between the parcels of property which they own and property
belonging to Gillmor. In the alternative, Garlick and Pelton have demonstrated that their
long use and possession of their properties has established at least adverse possession as
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to those properties. It is significant, and telling, that Gillmor waited six to nine years after
houses were built upon the Pelton and Garlick properties before filing this lawsuit claiming
to own the land under those improvements.
Under Utah law, a party claiming title to real property by adverse possession
must satisfy the requirements set out in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-12. That section
requires a claimant show that he has "occupied and claimed" the land for a period of seven
years continuously, and that he has "paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12. In granting the Garlicks*
and Pelton's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the Garlicks and
Pelton had presented evidence showing that they satisfied each of the requirements of
adverse possession and that Gillmor had presented no evidence creating an issue of fact
as to the Garlicks' and Pelton's adverse possession claim. Gillmor does not challenge the
trial court's finding that Garlick and Pelton have satisfied all requirements for adverse
possession, except for the payment of taxes.
I. GILLMOR HAS NOT PAID TAKES ON
THE GARLICK AND PELTON PROPERTY
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Pelton submitted an affidavit
attesting that he had received tax notices from Summit County for the Pelton property
each year and had paid taxes on the Pelton property every year since he purchased that
12

property in 1972. [R. 181.] In addition, Pelton submitted receipts for the payment of such
property taxes for the years 1980 through 1987. [R. 190-92.] In support of their motion
for summary judgment, the Gariicks submitted an affidavit of Ennis J. Gibbs in which he
attested that he had paid taxes on the Garlick property from the time he purchased the
property in 1978 until he sold the property to the Gariicks in 1987. [R. 171-72.]1 The
Gariicks also submitted an affidavit of Jeffrey K. Garlick in which he attested to the fact
that he had paid taxes on the Garlick property in 1987, after purchasing the property from
the Gibbs. [R. 165.] Attached as exhibits to those affidavits, were receipts from Summit
County showing payment of those taxes. [R. 169, 176-78.]
In opposition to this evidence, Gillmor submitted receipts showing his
payment of taxes with respect to the parcel of property identified by Summit County
Property Tax Serial No. SS-59-A, the Gillmor property, in the years 1986 through 1988.2

1

In their summary judgment motion, the Gariicks maintained that they were entitled
to "tack" to and claim the benefit of the possession of the Garlick property by Ennis J.
Gibbs, the Gariicks' predecessor in interest. In support of this position, the Gariicks relied
upon Roval Street Land Co. v. Reed. 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987), and Evans v.
Hogue. 681 P.2d 1133, 1140 (Ore. 1984). The right of the Gariicks to "tack" to the acts
of adverse possession of their predecessor, Ennis J. Gibbs, has not been challenged by
Gillmor in this appeal.
* Gillmor also submitted an affidavit attesting, among other things, that Gillmor had
paid property taxes with respect to the Garlick and Pelton property since 1926. However,
those portions of Gillmor's affidavit, paragraphs 5-9, were stricken by the trial court, [R.
254, 296] and Gillmor has not appealed the ruling striking those portions of his affidavit.
13

Before the trial court, and in this appeal, Gillmor argued that in 1986 and 1987 he paid
property taxes on the property identified under the Property Tax Serial No. SS-59-A prior
to the time that Garlick and Pelton paid the property taxes on their property. Relying on
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Parsons v. Anderson. 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984),
Gillmor argues that his payment of property taxes prior to the time that Pelton and Garlick
paid their property taxes interrupted the running of the acts required to demonstrate
adverse possession and defeated the Garlicks' and Pelton's claims to adverse possession.
In Parsons v. Anderson. 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984), and in other cases, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that where ownership of a parcel of property is disputed, f,the one who
pays first is to be deemed as having paid the taxes for the purposes of acquiring title by
adverse possession." Parsons v. Anderson. 690 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1984)(quoting Rio
Grande Western R.R. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co.. 101 P. 586 (1909)).
In response to Gillmor's argument, the Garlicks and Pelton noted that
Gillmor had paid property taxes only with respect to the parcel of property identified
under the Property Tax Serial No. SS-59-A, a parcel of property located entirely on the
east side of the county road. Gillmor introduced no evidence that he had ever paid
property taxes with respect to the Garlick and Pelton properties, which were identified
under the Summit County Tax Serial Nos. PP-87-15, PP-87-16, and PP-87-20, property
shown on the tax plat as located entirely on the west side of the county road. Thus,
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although Gillmor may have paid property taxes on his own parcel of property, located on
the east side of the county road, he never paid property taxes on the Garlick and Pelton
properties, which are located on the west side of that road.
Because the Garlick, Pelton and Gillmor properties bear separate tax serial
numbers and are shown in the Summit County tax records as being separate parcels, the
rule laid down in Parsons v. Anderson is simply inapplicable to this case. By paying the
taxes on the parcel identified as SS-59-A, Gillmor extinguished the tax liability on the
respect to that parcel. He did not, however, extinguish the tax liability on any other parcel
of property. Thus, taxes on the parcels identified as PP-87-15, PP-87-16, and PP-87-20, the
Garlick and Pelton property, were not shown as paid by Summit County, until the Garlicks
and Pelton paid those taxes.
To take advantage of the rule laid down in Parsons v. Anderson, 690 P.2d
535 (Utah 1984), Gillmor would have to show that he had paid taxes on the parcels of
property identified by the Summit County Property Tax Serial Nos. PP-87-15, PP-87-16, and
PP-87-20. Gillmor has not done so. Thus, the trial court properly entered summary
judgment that the Garlicks and Pelton had satisfied each of the requirements for adverse
possession of the Garlick and Pelton properties.
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II. THE WEST AFFIDAVITS DO NOT CREATE ISSUES OF FACT
THAT WOULD PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Following the trial court's entry of summary judgment, Gillmor moved the
trial court to reconsider its summary judgment ruling and submitted an affidavit of James
G. West, a surveyor, in support of that motion. [R. 278-82.] On February 7, 1989, the
trial court denied Gillmor's motion for reconsideration.

[R. 283.] Three days later,

Gillmor submitted a second affidavit of James G. West. [R. 289-93.] In his appeal,
Gillmor relies almost entirely on the two West affidavits as a basis for his claim that issues
of fact exist that require reversal of the summary judgment.
Gillmor's reliance on the West affidavits is misplaced, and those affidavits do
not create issues of material fact that would warrant reversal of the summary judgment,
for two reasons. First, the West affidavits were only filed with the trial court after the
court had entered its summary judgment ruling. The affidavits were filed untimely and,
therefore, did not affect the trial court's ruling and cannot be considered part of the record
on appeal. Second, the West affidavits purport to describe the boundaries of a parcel of
property that is not the same parcel of property described in the deeds upon which
Gillmor bases his claim to title to the Gillmor property. Thus, the West affidavits do not
describe any parcel of property at issue in this litigation and are irrelevant.
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A. THE WEST AFFIDAVITS WERE UNTIMELY
FILED WITH THE TRIAL COURT.
Although James G. West purported to survey the Gillmor property in July
and August 1987 [R. 179], over a year prior to the time that the Garlicks and Pelton
brought their summary judgment motion, neither of the West affidavits was submitted to
the trial court prior to the court's granting of the summary judgment motion on January
19, 1989. [R. 254.] Gillmor's attempt to create issues of fact by the submission of
additional affidavits under the cover of a motion to reconsider is a device that the Utah
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected as being procedurally improper. In Peay v. Peay,
607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), the court noted that it was unaware of any provision for
motions to reconsider under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Peay v. Peav, 607 P.2d
at 843. Articulating the reasons against allowing motions to reconsider, the court stated:
When [a motion has been made] and the court
has ruled upon the motion, if the party ruled against
were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion
for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse
himself, the question arises, why should not the other
party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a
motion for re-reconsideration, asking the court to again
reverse himself?
• . . [T]he new rules of procedure . . . were
designed to provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
which the parties and the courts could follow and rely
upon.... in order to avoid such a state of indecision for
both the judge and the parties, practical expediency
demands that there be some finality to the actions of the
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court; and he should not be in position of having the
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own
ruling.
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d at 843 (quoting Drurv v. Lunceford. 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 1966)).
See Tracv v. Univ. of Utah Hosp.. 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980). Even more specifically,
it has been held that:
Affidavits filed subsequent to the granting of a motion
for summary judgment cannot be considered. Garcia v.
American Marine Corp.. 432 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1970); See
City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 R2d 681 (7th Cir.
1975).
People in Interest of F. L. G., 563 P.2d 379, 381 (Col. App. 1977). See a]so O'Neill v.
State. 732 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Mont. 1987)(rejecting affidavits and brief that were untimely
filed in opposition to summary judgment motion).
Had Gillmor been unable to assemble affidavits in order to timely respond
to the Garlicks' and Pelton's summary judgment motion, a procedure exists under Rule
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by which he could have secured additional time
in which to assemble those affidavits. Indeed, Gillmor requested and received additional
time in which to respond to the Garlicks' and Pelton's motion. [R. 207-10.] However, the
fact that West, by his own admission, had conducted his survey of the Gillmor property
over a year prior to the time the Garlicks and Pelton brought their summary judgment
motion effectively negates any supposition that the matters contained in the West affidavits
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could not have been presented by Gillmor prior to the court's ruling on the summary
judgment motions.
Certainly, the second West affidavit, which was submitted to the court three
days after the court had denied Gillmor's motion to reconsider, cannot be considered part
of the record on this appeal. Because that affidavit came after the trial court had entered
its final ruling, the trial court was not in a position to consider that affidavit nor did the
Garlicks and Pelton have an opportunity to rebut that affidavit. Likewise, the first West
affidavit, which was submitted as part of a procedurally improper motion to reconsider,
cannot form part of the record on this appeal.
B. THE WEST AFFIDAVITS DO NOT EXAMINE THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE GILLMOR PROPERTY.
Even if the Court considers the West affidavits to be properly part of the
record before the Court on this appeal, those affidavits do not create an issue of material
fact that would warrant reversal of the trial court's summary judgment. The first West
affidavit, dated January 24, 1989, indicates that West was engaged by Gillmor in July and
August of 1987 to survey the boundary lines of Gillmor's property. [R. 279.] In paragraph
3 of his affidavit, West describes the parcel of property which Gillmor asked him to survey.
[R. 279.] That property description is, however, not the same as in any of the deeds which
Gillmor identifies as the basis for his title to the Garlick and Pelton property. [Compare
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R. 247, 250 with R. 279.] Significantly, the property description which Gillmor asked West
to survey, and which is the subject of West's opinion in his first affidavit, makes no
reference to the county road as being a boundary of the property.

Likewise, the

description of the property which Gillmor asked West to survey does not conform to the
parcel of property identified as belonging to Gillmor in the Summit County tax records.
The conclusions reached by West in his first affidavit are, therefore, simply irrelevant to
the issues in this litigation, because West has not examined the boundaries of any parcel
of property that is at issue in this litigation.
In his second affidavit, filed with court on February 10, 1989, West opines
that the property descriptions which he used in his initial survey and the f'metes and
bounds" description set forth in "the original deed description" are the same, and are the
same as the "metes and bounds" description of the Gillmor property contained in the
Summit County tax records. [R. 290-91.] West's second affidavit is conclusory in form,
does not identify the "original deed" which he compared with the property description
which he had initially used in his survey, and for those reasons, would have been subject
to a motion to strike had the affidavit been timely submitted to the court.
Even accepting the substance of the second West affidavit, that affidavit does
not create an issue of fact challenging the summary judgment. The West affidavit is
carefully drafted to indicate that West has compared only the "metes and bounds"
20

descriptions of the Gillmore property in the various instruments and tax records which
he examined. [See R. 289-92.] A metes and bounds property description is described as,
"a way of describing land by listing the compass directions and distances of the boundaries."
Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed. 1979, at 894. It is apparent, therefore, that West has, in
comparing "metes and bounds" descriptions contained in the various instruments, extracted
descriptions of the Gillmor property set forth in terms of distances and compass angles
and has ignored the calls in those instruments limiting the Gillmor property to the county
road forming its west boundary. Thus, West's survey (contained in the record at 282)
shows the Gillmor property straying across the county road to the west side of that road
and encroaching on the Garlick and Pelton property.
As a matter of law, however, the calls in the Gillmor deeds identifying the
county road as the west boundary of that property take precedence over a "metes and
bounds" description of that property.

It is generally accepted that calls in property

descriptions to natural or artificial monuments3 take precedent over descriptions in terms
3

"Monuments" have been defined by the courts as follows:
In the surveying parlance, a "monument" is a natural or
artificial physical object on the ground which helps to
establish a line. Natural monuments are such things as
trees, rivers, stone outcroppings, creeks, and land
features. Artificial monuments are such as fences, stakes,
roads, and things placed by human hand.
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of "metes and bounds" or courses and distances: "[T]he general rule provides that calls for
monuments control over calls for courses and distances." Bean v. Kmetic. 580 P.2d 1022,
1024 (Ore. 1978). This rule has, likewise, been consistently followed by the Utah Supreme
Court. For example in Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley. 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943),
the Utah Supreme Court held that a conveyance limiting lands conveyed to the west side
of a highway controlled over distance calls in that conveyance. The court stated that,
"permanent and natural objects and monuments or landmarks designated in descriptions
control over metes and bounds." Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley. 141 P.2d at 165
(citations omitted.) More recently, the Supreme Court has stated that, "where there is
such ambiguity, monument calls take precedence over calls of courses or distances. . . ."
Williams v. Oldrovd. 581 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1978).
The language in the deeds by which Gillmor received title to the Gillmor
property limits the land conveyed to Gillmor to the west side of the county road. If the
"metes and bounds" description of the Gillmor property is in conflict with that description,
as a matter of law, the deed description limiting the conveyance to the east side of the
county road controls.

West's affidavit, which addresses only a "metes and bounds"

description of the Gillmor property, ignores the fact that the deeds conveying that property

Sowerwine v. Nielson. 671 P.2d 295, 299 (Wyo. 1983).
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to Gillmor expressly limit the conveyance to the east side of the county road. West's
second affidavit creates no issue of material fact and presents no basis for reversing the
trial court's summary judgment.
III. GILLMOR'S PAYMENT OF TAXES CANNOT DEFEAT THE
GARLICKS' AND PELTON'S ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Even if it is accepted that Gillmor paid taxes on the Garlick property in 1986
before the Garlicks paid those taxes, and that Gillmor paid taxes on the Pelton property
in 1987 before Pelton paid those taxes, the Garlicks* and Pelton's claims to adverse
possession remain intact. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the Garlicks
and Pelton demonstrated adverse possession of the Garlick and Pelton property for periods
substantially in excess of the statutory seven years. For example, Pelton demonstrated
adverse possession of his property for a period of fifteen years, including payment of taxes
for fifteen years. Likewise, the Garlicks demonstrated adverse possession of the Garlick
property, including payment of taxes on that property, for a period of ten years.
Even accepting Gillmor's claims, Gillmor has shown only that he has reduced
Pelton's period of adverse possession of the Pelton property from a period of fifteen to
fourteen years. The elements of Pelton's claim for adverse possession remain intact and
Pelton has more than satisfied the statutory seven year period. Similarly, even accepting
Gillmor's claims, Gillmor's payment of taxes on the Garlick property in 1986 before the
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Garlicks paid those taxes reduces the Garlicks period of adverse possession from ten years
to eight years. Again, even accepting Gillmor's claims, the Garlicks have more than
satisfied the statutory seven year period.

CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that the Garlicks and Pelton have, in fact, paid taxes for
more than seven continuous years on the parcels of property identified in the Summit
County tax records as the Garlicks and Pelton property.

Gillmor has presented no

evidence that he has ever paid taxes on the parcels of property identified under the
Summit County Tax Serial Nos. of PP-87-15, PP-87-16, and PP-87-20. Gillmor's sole claim
in this appeal is that by paying taxes on the Gillmor property, identified under the Summit
County Tax Serial No. of SS-59-A, he also paid taxes on portions of the Garlicks and
Pelton property and, thereby, interrupted the running of the adverse possession statutes.
The record is simply and clearly contrary to Gillmor's claims. Summit County tax records
show Gillmor's property to be located on the east side of the county road and the Garlick
and Pelton property located on the west side of that road. Thus, Gillmor has not paid
taxes on the Garlick and Pelton property and has not interrupted the running of the statute
on the Garlicks' and Pelton's adverse possession claim.
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Gillmor has, similarly, failed to present any issue of material, admissible fact
showing that the description of the Gillmor property contained in the Summit County tax
records includes any portion of the property claimed by Garlick and Pelton. Affidavits
submitted by Gillmor of the surveyor James G. West do not constitute part of the record
on appeal, because those affidavits were untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, those
affidavits do not, as a matter of law, describe the boundaries of the Gillmor property as
set forth in the deeds of conveyance in Gillmor's chain of title or in the Summit County
tax records.
Finally, even if all of Gillmor's claims are accepted, the undisputed evidence
establishes that the Garlicks and Pelton have satisfied all of the requirements for adverse
possession of the Garlick and Pelton property.

Because the Garlicks and Pelton

demonstrated adverse possession of their property for periods substantially in excess of the
seven years required by Utah statute, Gillmor's claimed payment of taxes on the Garlick
and Pelton property in 1986 and 1987 are not sufficient to reduce the Garlicks and Pelton
periods of adverse possession to less than seven years.
For these reasons, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in
favor of defendants Garlicks and Pelton and dismissing Gillmor's claims to any portion of
the Garlicks and Pelton property. That judgment should be affirmed by this Court.
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